ASEAN in Question: Non-Interference is Not the Answer for Myanmar Crisis (and Beyond)
On April 24th, 2021, 5 points of consensus were reached in the ASEAN emergency summit following the post-coup humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. Following the consensus, Erywan Pehin Yusof, Brunei’s senior diplomat, has been appointed as a special envoy to facilitate dialogue between conflicting parties (Allard, 2021). However, no significant development can be seen so far as the country’s stability plunged into turmoil and the economy has collapsed combined with the ongoing coronavirus pandemic. On the other hand, the oposing party and shadow government, National Unity Government (NUG) of Myanmar, just assembled its supporters and declared a “people’s defensive war” against the military junta (Strangio, 2021), signaling the country might lead towards another civil war.
Such case of humanitarian crisis often needs a swift, effective response — and some degree of humanitarian intervention — to take place immidiately. Still, the ASEAN non-interference principle, one of the fundamental principles of this association (Stubbs*, 2008) which holds member states to from interferring other member’s internal affairs, has been proved to be a great obstacle. Myanmar coup is not the first case where crisis in this region could not get a quick and enough response. These repeating failures spark one of the most fundamental debate within ASEAN community: to question whether the principle of non-interference principle is still relevant. In 2015 and 2017, a humanitarian crisis and violence in Rakhine has presented a huge numbers of displacement of Rohingya people, leading to a massive scale of refugee crisis in the region, a situation which ASEAN failed to prevent. Back in 1975, ASEAN also had little to no significant presence in the Timor Leste annexation by Indonesia that led to over 100,000 casualties during the 24 years of bloody occupation.
Therefore, it is time for ASEAN to actually start a serious, formal reconsideration on this particular principle. Rather, ASEAN community should start their talk on formalizing a limited interference, especially one that functions in time of crisis. At the same time, ASEAN countries should reaffirm their commitment towards an inclusive democracy that favor its people and progress towards a better functioning integrated community. For the next months and years to come, ASEAN will be tested and we will witness which side it takes position: will it succeed in de-escalating the political-humanitarian crisis, restoring justice, and defending democracy in Myanmar and beyond — or will this regional organization once again get stucked in a cycle, blocked from taking decisive action in the name of national sovereignty?
References
Allard, T., 2021. ASEAN appoints Brunei diplomat as envoy to Myanmar. Reuters, [online] Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/asean-appoints-bruneis-erywan-yusof-envoy-myanmar-sources-2021-08-04/> [Accessed 15 September 2021].
Strangio, S., 2021. Myanmar Shadow Government Declares ‘National Uprising’ Against Military Rule. The Diplomat, [online] Available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/myanmar-shadow-government-declares-national-uprising-against-military-rule/> [Accessed 15 September 2021].
Stubbs*, R., 2008. The ASEAN alternative? Ideas, institutions and the challenge to ‘global’ governance. The Pacific Review, 21(4), pp.451–468.
